distinct elements must exist en te psyche.
Our first problem is the meaning of this Active Intellect is at some time at least not separated from the Passive, it is clear that it cannot be -wholly transcendent.
May we say, however, that although the Active Intellect is not entirely transcendent, it is to be regarded as a single Intellect immanent in a number of human souls during their lifetime? Aristotle compares the Active Intellect to art which has ( "" ;._ /\
I\ )
of Man, but there is no such existent as Man.
Rather we sh ould say that Peleus is the father of Achilles. Similarly Art is not the efficient cause of the sculpting of a block of marble into the form of a statue. The cause is rather the particular form of the statue in the mind of the sculptor who is the efficient cause of the product. Thus if we are to put any weight at all upon Aristotle's comparison of the Active and PasE-1i ve
Intellects to Art and its material, we must say that it is not Active Intellect, but a particular Active Intellect, that is the element in the soul which nmakes all things", just as it is the particular art of the particular sculptor which causes the production of the statue. Aristotle then means by his phrase en t� psyc� "inside the individual soul11• Every soul therefore contains its own individual Active and Passive Intellect.
The interpretations of this passage which spring from the minds of Alexander of
4
Aphrodisias and Averroes must be rejected.
Our interpretation, however, is apparently in accordance with that of Theophrastus (�. to both the distinction between Active a.nd Passive Intellect is irrelevant. There will therefore be no further discussion here of the nous thyrathen.
We may say then that there are within each individual soul an Active and a Passive Intellect. The Active Intellect is the moving factor and the Passive the factor that is moved. We may perhaps compare the doctrine of the Physics that all souls, and indeed everything in motion, require an efficient as well as a material cause. 11If then everything that is in motion must be moved by something, and that something must either be moved in its turn by something else or not, and in the latter case it is the true agent and we need go no further, but in the other case we must run it back until we do reach a primary mover not moved by-something else ••• then it follows that if everything that is in motion is moved by some agent, and if the primary agent itself is in motion but is not moved by anything else, it must be moved by itself (256Al4 -22).11 Aristotle then of course goes on to demonstrate that the first mover is not in fact self-moved but unmoved, but this does not concern us here. We are simply concerned to recognize that the individual �' not being an unmoved mover, must itself be moved in some such way by an efficient cause. Furthermore, as we know, the efficient cause is present in the nous itself; it is in fact the Active Intellect.
II
After determining that the Active Intellect is present in the soul, we must next consider the nature of its activity.
Aristotle tells us that it functions 11by making all things". We must th erefore unravel the meaning of th is phrase. In his book on Aristotle,
Ross held that the function of the Active Intellect is to bring the Passive Intellect up from potentiality to actuality by making it actually know its objects. · So far so good, but he then supposes that for this to be possible, the Active Intellect must be "something in us that actually knows already, some el ement that is cut off from our ordinary consciousness so that we are not aware of (its) pre- This is certainly what Aristotle says, but the real point is that all things are 1 1made11 in the soul.· All the objects of thought are 11made11 into characteristics of the Passive Intellect which thus "is made" or "becomes" al.1
things. Thus when one thought gives way to the next, the Passive Intellect, now "made" of one kind of thought, is made into another. This is the only way in which it could in fact "become all things11.
In rejecting Intellect is the efficient cause of th ought, are we to suppose that as Peleus, a man in act, is the father of Achilles, so the Active Intellect, if it is to cause th ought, must itself have thought:
We should realize from the start that the comparison of th e Intellects 11vd.th
Peleus and Achilles must be misleading. Peleus is external to Achilles, but the Active
I\
Intellect and the nous noon are both in the soul. The efficient cause of thought in the soul is not comparable to Peleus, but to that inherited power of development handed on by Peleus to Achilles himself. After Achilles is born, his efficient cause is in himself.
We may in a sense say that it is in act, since it is effective, but the immanent efficient cause in Achilles is not in actuality a man.
No more need the Active Intellect be possessed of any knowledge of the external world -for if it were, it would be identical with its objects and thus also pathetikos -nor need it have any such pre-existing knowledge of which we ourselves are unaware, as Ross suggests. The efficient cause in Achilles is not a man in actuality, but a power that is capable of making Achilles, now a boy, into a man.
Similarly there is no need for the Active Intellect to be possessed of actual knowledge, at any rate of the external world; rather it is the power which enables such knowledge to be abstracted by the Passive Intellect.
This rather strange nature of the Active Intellect explains very well the apparent confusion of terminology which Aristotle uses to describe it.
It also explain s , as we shall see, why the comparison of the Active Intellect with light is so peculiarly apt.
In line 15, the Active Intellect is described as hexis tis, while in line 18 it is an energeia. Commentators have found this puzzling. Hicks, after noting that in a 13 number of passages hexis is practically a synonym for eidos, writes: 11That which is always actual and never potential can only be described as a hexis by a stretch of the term. Hence tis.11 But the Active Intellect is an unusual kind of energeia in any case.
Again it seems comparable to the power to stimulate growth inherent in Achilles. This power might reasonably be called a kind of 11positiv e quality" ( the phrase is Hicks' ) or an actuality. Peleus, of course, could only be described as an actuality, not as a kind of disposition. Hexis is thus also particularly appropriate to an efficient cause in the soul, rather than external to it. Most interesting still is the fact that light itself, to which the Active Intellect is compared, is one of the activities which can at times be called a hexis. At De Anima 3.5.15 it is given as an example of a hexis, yet below it acts as an efficient cause and we would suppose it to be an activity. Indeed elsewhere this is almost always what it is.
At De Anima �.18B9 and 419All it is an energeia tou
diaphanous.
Yet at 418Bl9 it is by implication a hexis. The truth of the matter is that
Aristotle's terminology of ,·,potentiality", 11actuality", "disposition", is sometimes insufficiently precise to achieve an exact description of the phenomena with which he is concerned.
It is well kno-wn that Alexander of Aphrodisias' attitude towards this should realize that there is no need to suppose that it has some kind of pre-existing knowledge of the external world of whose existence we are unaware. 'rhe power of grol.Arth in Achilles is not identical with Achilles the man, nor is it any kind of potentiality of Achilles the man; rather it is the power which produces Achilles the man.
\rfo might call it poi�tikon. Sirrdlarly light is not identical with the colours which it produces, nor is it any kind of 11pre-colour11 in the ordinary sense of 11colour"; rather it is, as we shall see, the colour of the transparent, which must make it different from ordinary colours.
Similarly the Active Intellect does not possess ordinary knowledge ( and thus is not any thought which is formally identical with the external. object of thought ) either in a form of which we are conscious or in any other form; rather it is the power which /\ enables the Passive Intellect to become a nous noon by being made identical with the We know too that it is in act and that it is a hexis tis, like light.
Since this is so, the potential knowledge that is prior in the individual cannot be the
knowledge of itself, if it is continually conscious of itself and intuits itself in an eternal present without memory of the past or imagination of the future.
Thus the Active
Intellect which thinks continually and cannot kno w the external world must be thinking ( if we can call it "thinking11 -perhaps "being conscious" would be a better phrase
In th is respect it is comparable with God who is noesis noeseos in the 27 Ivietaphysics (1074B33).
Scarcely anyone nowadays is disposed to take seriously the identification of the Active Intellect with God made by Alexander of Aphrodisias� but we can at least learn to see how such an identification might have seemed plausible. We have demonstrated here certain features of the Active Intellect akin to those of God, but although to move from similarity to identity would be rash, yet at lea.st a recognition that the highest aspect of the human mind can have no knowledge of the external world may help us to understand why the God of the Metaphysics a fortiori cannot have such knowledge.
This God is said to be very good (1072B30) and to think what is best (1074B33).
Clearly the best must be more akin to the Active than to the Passive Intellect of man, and clearly the thought of God must be more akin to the thought of that Active Intellect.
Thus if the Active Intellect has no memory and no knowledge of the external world, we
should not be surprised that Aristotle refuses to attribute such memory and knowledge to
God.
Perhaps we may sa3r that Aristotle envisages both God and the Active Intellect as the power of thought understood as thought of itself.
VI
Yet in this discussion of the nature of the Active Intellect by it self is not a fundamental difficulty being neglected?
vJe. have seen already that the Active Intellect is during our lifetime 11in the soul11 and th at it acts as a necessary efficient cause of thought. Yet since the soul is a unity an.ct exists as a unity, how can Aristotle hold that some part of it ( i.e. the Active Intellect ) can exist separately after death? The ,
